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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate post-acquisition integration of acquired firms and 
subsequent developments in new subsidiary strategic responsibilities in value-chain 
activities. Using comparative case study methodology, we illustrate the forms, degrees 
and evolution of strategic responsibilities using in-depth analysis of six acquisitions 
from the Danish brewery, Carlsberg. The analysis reveals that the initial mandates at the 
time of acquisition were designed based on new subsidiaries’ core competencies and 
resources, and Carlsberg’s acquisition motives. Yet, the mandates did not remain static. 
Over time, some subsidiaries gained new value chain mandates or they substantially 
increased their scale in terms of production capacities or the markets in which they 
operated. From the practical point of view, this implies managers of the acquiring firm 
must pay close attention to the form and extent of integration if the acquisition is fulfill 
its potential. 
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 Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) constitute an important part of multinational 
corporations’ growth. Research in M&A has attracted attention of scholars from a 
variety of disciplines and perspectives, notably financial economics (Stahl and Voigt, 
2008; Aktas, de Bodt and Cosuin, 2007; Dixon, Wilcox, Chang and Grover, 2001), 
strategic management (Chatterjee, 2009; Cartwright, 2006), organizational behavior 
(Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan, 2006; Birkinshaw, Bresman and Håkanson, 2000) 
and international business (Morosini, Shane and Sing, 1998; Verbeke, 2010). The vast 
extant literature covers a broad range of topics such as corporate partnerships, 
diversification and corporate strategy, CEOs and top management teams, learning and 
knowledge, restructuring, integration issues, entry modes and international strategy, 
corporate governance, culture, organizational structure, technology and innovation, etc.  
Research on post-merger or acquisition integration focuses on the process design 
as the key to the ultimate success or failure of the merger or acquisition. This literature 
has analyzed different challenges to the post-merger of acquisition process, such as 
motives, speed and degree of integration, the level of autonomy to be granted to the 
newly acquired unit, organizational fit, employee and top management turnover, and 
knowledge transfer. Integration issues have found a prominent place in international 
business research, with scholars focusing on common processes that allow for greater 
coordination within multinational corporations (MNC) and the role of integrating 
mechanisms. One element of integration considerations, and related strategies, is the 
functions and stages of value-chain activities to be integrated (Schweizer, 2008). 
Griffith et al. (2008) performed a study of the drivers of research agenda in international 
business and the emerging themes to dominate the agenda in future work. Not 
surprisingly, the configuration of value-adding activities by MNCs is identified as one 
of the primary research themes in future international business research. Meyer et al., 
(2010), and Vahlne and Ivarsson (2014) emphasize the dynamic and context-dependent 
challenge of reconfiguration and coordination of such activities in the process of 
building competitive advantage and coping with institutional contexts.   
Among the most important aspects of these activities are the strategic 
responsibilities allocated to subsidiaries. In this paper we investigate the allocation and 
reallocation of strategic responsibilities to MNC subsidiaries in the brewery sector by 
taking a longitudinal view of some of the foreign breweries acquired by the Danish 
MNC brewer Carlsberg over time. In particular, we focus on changes in the 
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 subsidiaries’ charters in terms of the value-chain activities delegated to them. “Strategic 
responsibilities” are defined as subsidiaries’ mandates detailing the value-chain 
activities delegated to the unit and the resources the subsidiary can use for those 
activities.  
Surveys of the roles played by subsidiaries in MNCs highlight significant 
variability in terms of the value-chain activities they handle (White and Poynter 1984; 
Birkinshaw and Morrison 1995). For example, some subsidiaries handle all value-chain 
activities on a small scale, whereas others, such as sales or manufacturing units, 
specialize in only a few value-chain activities but on a larger scale (White and Poynter 
1984). Furthermore, some subsidiaries operate only within the host country, while 
others achieve global mandates (Birkinshaw and Morrison 1995). Although the 
evidence implies substantial heterogeneity, the extant literature seems to lack a 
framework for analyzing how subsidiary mandates are formed at the time of their 
acquisition or establishment, and how those mandates evolve over time. The literature 
on M&A integration is rich in relation to the development of target firms that turn into 
subsidiaries once acquired by an MNC (Ahammad and Glaister, 2011; Weber, Tarba 
and Reichel, 2011). Yet, the level of integration and its evolution across time and space 
are seldom discussed as an outcome of value chain integration. Instead, other 
parameters have been used, such as the degree of centralization of decision making 
rights (Ahammad and Glaister, 2011). In this study, our research question is what drives 
MNCs’ integration of acquired firms’ value chain activities and how an MNC integrates 
newly acquired firms in the brewery industry.  
Through this study we make several contributions to the M&A and international 
business literatures. First, we provide a framework for understanding the heterogeneity 
of subsidiary mandates even within one MNC. Our analysis suggests that one-size-fits-
all approach, where one kind of mandate applies to all subsidiaries of an MNC, does not 
capture the complexity and uniqueness of a given acquisition. Secondly, we provide 
evidence of the factors that determine the evolution of mandates over time. By moving 
from a static towards a longitudinal view of subsidiary mandates, we show the role 
played by environmental dynamism in the evolution of subsidiaries’ strategic 
responsibilities. Lastly, we contribute by investigating how value chain activities are re-
distributed following a takeover in a particular context, namely the brewery industry. 
Focusing on one industry allows us to avoid lumping together phenomena underlined by 
different motives and resource requirements. The brewery industry is an important 
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 context for examining integration processes. The main features that make it worthy of a 
detailed analysis are that all participants have adopted similar technologies globally, 
they offer homogenous product, the industry is dominated by a few large MNCs 
actively engaged in M&As, and it is highly internationalized (Gammelgaard and 
Dorrenbacher, 2013). Further, the industry is also characterized by significant cross-
country institutional, regulatory and cultural differences that make it fertile ground to 
investigate organizational and strategic issues.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the 
arguments on subsidiary roles and M&A integration. Our theoretical propositions are 
then illustrated through a detailed look at the Danish brewer Carlsberg, its 
internationalization process and its overall strategy in terms of its acquired companies. 
This is based on a close examination of Carlsberg’s strategy for six of its takeover 
targets becoming subsidiaries. These subsidiaries have been carefully selected because 
they reflect the diversity of mandates within a single multinational. In the concluding 
section, we summarize and discuss our findings.  
 
Literature Review 
Following the acquisition of a target firm, the acquiring firm may choose to 
delegate strategic responsibilities in the form of value-chain mandates to its subsidiaries 
(Galunic and Eisenhardt 1996; Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard 2010). That is, 
headquarters may choose to allocate or reallocate value-chain activities to the MNC’s 
divisions or subsidiaries. The drivers of this process and the instruments available to 
headquarters have been widely discussed in the literature. For instance, Yamin and 
Ghauri (2010) suggest that MNC structures revolve around the disintegration of the 
value chain. In many cases, subsidiaries are likely to perform narrowly specialized 
value-chain functions. The development of ICT technologies has, to a large extent, 
supported this trend towards subsidiary specialization. As a result, some subsidiaries 
provide goods and/or services for all parts of the MNC or, at least, for large parts of it. 
Alternatively, subsidiaries can provide goods/services to specific parts of the MNC’s 
global markets (Holm and Pedersen 2000). Consequently, an MNC can be seen as an 
organic organization, and upgrades or downgrades of subsidiary strategic 
responsibilities in relation to the value chain occur regularly.  
One view of the MNC presents it as an internal market in which subsidiaries 
compete for headquarters’ attention and resources (Cerrato 2006). The resulting 
4 
 
 mandates are outcome of the on-going bargaining between headquarters and 
subsidiaries. In this process, subsidiaries benefit from their possession of specialized 
resources (Mahoney and Pandian 1992). In fact, subsidiaries are likely to lose mandates 
when they lack such resources (Egelhoff et al. 1998). Possessing of resources is likely 
to create situations of resource dependency, which increase the bargaining power of the 
subsidiary, when advocating for new strategic responsibilities in relation to the value 
chain (Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008). The outcome of this bargaining process will also 
depend on the acquisition motives of the MNC, especially those related to value chain. 
The M&A literature has discussed such motives to some extent. For instance, several 
studies have surveyed how corporations like Intel, General Electric and Nestlé all 
initiated technology-driven acquisitions during the 1990s as a vehicle to develop 
capabilities (Bower, 2001; Mitchell & Capron, 2002; Ranft & Lord, 2000). Yet, as 
Gammelgaard (2004) points out, early surveys of M&A motives were restricted to 
include only resource exploitation strategies, focusing on investigating the direct effect, 
such as increased market shares, cost reductions and risk minimization through 
diversification. Other studies though have emphasized other factors, such as access to 
the sales functions and related market access, as drivers of acquisitions (Newbould, 
1970; Baker et al, 1981; Lindgren, 1982; Hunt et al, 1987; Suverkrup & Hauschildt, 
1990; Davis et al, 1993; Norburn & Schoenberg, 1994).  
The link between acquisition motive and post-acquisition integration can be 
established via the resource-based view of the firm. Penrose’s (1959) growth theory 
predicts that current acquisitive growth is an outcome of previous organic and 
acquisitive growth. Companies are, or should be, constrained by their past investments, 
which are likely to lead to path dependencies in future strategic action (Teece et al., 
1997). Brouthers and Dikova (2010) point out that the degree of integration is an 
outcome of how ‘strategic flexible’ an acquiring company can be. Further, Lockett et al. 
(2011) emphasize that growth constraints are due to adjustment cost, which includes the 
time and efforts used in integrating new managers and operations in expanding the 
activities of the firm. This is especially important where resources need to be transferred 
from the acquiring to the acquired firm, in order to integrate and create synergy effects 
(Nooteboom, 1999).1  
1 An aspect omitted from our analysis is the cultural distances between the acquiring and acquired firms. 
Even though cultural mis-match has been associated with high failure rates of M&A (Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999), cultural distance has also proven to enhance performance, as acquisitions provide 
access to valuable pools of critical embedded resources and practices otherwise not available to the 
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 Synergy effects are consequently tightly related to the integration of the target 
firm. Integration strategies have often been associated with the framework developed by 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). The right integration strategy depends on the need for 
autonomy on the one hand, and the strategic interdependence on the other hand. In the 
case of the acquisition of a small company with no strategic important resources beyond 
access to markets, or the possibility of gaining synergy through rationalizations, 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggest an absorption strategy. In other cases, high 
levels of autonomy would be preferred, especially if the target firm owns important 
strategic resources likely to be destroyed if integrated too rapidly. The outcome could be 
that key resources leave the firm (Paruchuri, Nerkar & Hambrick, 2006). In such a case, 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggest adaptation of a preservation strategy (high 
autonomy/low integration), which over time develops to a symbiosis strategy.  The need 
for integration is created by the fact that acquired resources only unfold their value 
when being redeployed in a resource reconfiguration process with the acquiring firm’s 
resources (Hitt et al. 2001; Capron et al., 2001). Further, Wicklund and Shepherd (2009) 
argue that firms that have been engaged more often and more intensely in resource 
combination activities develop a stronger capability to discover and leverage synergies.  
On the other hand, autonomy combined with integration is preferable as a lack of 
integration effort and employee resistance is seen as basic reason for the failure of 
acquisitions to realize synergies (King et al., 2004).  
The Haspeslagh and Jemison’ (1991) framework serves as the starting point of 
Schweizer’ (2005) study of the integration of biotech firms into pharmaceutical 
companies. Building upon the Haspeslagh and Jemison’ (1991) framework, Schweizer 
proposes a hybrid strategy based on the value chain model.  Instead of a ‘one size fits 
all’ strategy, where the target firm is either ‘preserved’ or ‘absorbed’, he suggests an 
independent strategy for each value chain activity of the target firm. In such case, 
marketing activities could be absorbed and R&D activities could be preserved. He even 
suggests the hybrid strategy for each value chain. For instance, in case of R&D, tests of 
new drugs could be preserved, and patenting procedures could be absorbed.   
We investigate our research question using Schweizer’ framework augmented 
with insights from the subsidiary role literature. Although Schweizer’ framework was 
developed for the pharmaceutical industry, it is general enough to be applicable in other 
acquiring firm (Morosoni et al., 1998. In general, new research points at mixed finding in relation to how 
culture affects integration (Ahammad and Glaister, 2011; Weber, Tarba and Reichel, 2011). 
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 settings. However, as Schweizer himself acknowledged, the strength and nature of the 
relationships in the framework are likely to be context dependent, with the results 
influenced by industry and M&A characteristics. The brewery industry displays 
significantly different attributes than the pharmaceuticals industry, making it a perfect 
setting to test the importance of context to applicability of the hybrid integration 
approach. Our starting assumption is that the target firms will be given some value 
chain charters, with some seeing an increase whereas others a decrease in 
responsibilities. Further, the acquirer can adopt different entrance strategies and 
intervene in numerous ways, while the target firms can hold varying levels and qualities 
of resources. We therefore expect some subsidiaries to develop strategic responsibility 
in relation to the value chain, while others likely to lose such strategic responsibility. 
However, we aim at adding some nuance to this notion by investigating whether these 
two lines of development occur simultaneously, so that subsidiaries win and lose 
mandates at the same time.  
 
Methodology 
The investigation of our research question is done through comparative case 
study research methodology (Yin, 2003). Given the amount of detailed information 
required to analyze the issues surrounding M&A integration, the application of 
qualitative design is called for as it allows deep understanding, local contextualization 
and causal inference (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The M&A literature has long relied 
on similar approaches (Schweizer, 2005; Bower, 2004; Javidan et al., 2004). The choice 
of the brewery industry as context of our study is driven by several features that make it 
worthy of a detailed analysis, such as the domination of the industry by a few large 
MNCs actively engaged in M&As and its highly international nature, with most M&As 
taking place across borders, bringing significant cross-country institutional, regulatory 
and cultural differences that are expected to impact integration strategies. 
The choice of the cases, both the acquirer and the acquired companies, is crucial 
as it will influence the depth of the analysis and significance of the results. In terms of 
the acquirer we have chosen one company, the Danish brewer Carlsberg. The rationale 
behind the choice of a single acquirer is to be able to capture differences in integration 
strategies brought about by different entry strategies and motives. The integration 
strategies of the acquirer are then analyzed using a sample of acquisitions made over 
time. The choice of these acquisitions was based on the following several criteria: a) the 
7 
 
 similar size of investment (with the conjecture that larger investments increase the 
likelihood of autonomy and strategic autonomy), b) the location of the new subsidiaries 
(with all of the analyzed acquisitions made in Europe, including Russia, a condition 
included to reduce the effect of cultural diversity), and c) each acquisition represented 
the first experience of Carlsberg with the respective country. From all the acquisitions 
made by Carlsberg only six passed the criteria and as such are used in the study. All the 
acquisitions were made during the 1990s and 2000s, with the earliest one made in 1996 
and the latest in 2008. The data we use in the analysis are obtained from archival 
sources, company reports and articles in the financial press. The data are used to flesh 
out the arguments made in academic sources, and provide interesting nuanced accounts 
of events within the company and the personalities involved.  
 
Case Discussions and Findings 
This section presents the main findings from case analysis, highlighting 
the differences and commonalities in integration of acquired firms.  
 
Carlsberg’s Acquisition Motives and General Integration Strategy 
In the early stages of the internationalization, current players dominating 
the brewery industry, such as Anheuser Busch InBev, Heineken, SABMiller and 
Carlsberg, relied on less risky export strategies or licensing agreements. In a typical 
staged internationalization process, these entry modes were followed by international 
joint ventures with local breweries and then, especially over the past decade, with 
international mergers and acquisitions (Madsen et al., 2011; Ebneth and Theuvsen, 
2007). These mergers and acquisitions offered the acquiring firms quick access to new 
markets and the related brands of the target firms. The acquiring firms could thereby 
distribute their own international brands in new markets utilizing the distribution 
systems of the target firm or introduce the acquired brands to new markets, as these 
brands often corresponded to speciality type of beers. Often, the acquirers’ branded 
beers, such as Heineken, Budweiser, Stella Artois and Carlsberg, were also produced 
locally, at the expense of locally branded beers (Dieng et al. 2009). Further synergies 
were achieved through cost reductions via rationalizations and resource redistribution, 
often manifested by technology transfers from the acquiring to the acquired firm.  
Carlsberg is a large Danish brewery founded in 1847 by Carl Jacobsen. Today, 
Carlsberg is one of the world’s leading breweries with activities in more than 150 
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 countries in which it markets more than 500 brands. Carlsberg’s global reach has 
resulted in a high degree of internationalization, as expressed by the fact that foreign 
sales account for 92.6 per cent of total sales (Carlsberg 2011). Many minor markets are 
reached through export and licensing agreements (Carlsberg 2010), with only 29 
subsidiaries listed in its annual report as having significant operations. These 
subsidiaries though employ most of the Carlsberg’s 41000 employees. The Carlsberg 
Group produces 10895 million liters of beer annually and had net revenue of USD 
10695 million in 2010 (Datamonitor, 2011). Carlsberg’s most important brand is 
Carlsberg, which is also its most recognized and fastest-growing beer brand on a global 
basis (Carlsberg, 2008). Other well-known brands on an international scale are Tuborg, 
Baltika and Kronenbourg 1664. The company has a strong market presence in 
Denmark, Norway, Finland, France, Russia, the UK, Laos, Nepal, Cambodia, Malaysia 
and Vietnam. It has a weaker presence in the Americas (Datamonitor 2011).  
Although Carlsberg started to export to the British market in the nineteenth 
century, its internationalization adventure did not really take off until after World War 
II. At that time, Carlsberg and its associated brewer Tuborg intensified their marketing 
campaigns abroad that led to a tripling of exports between 1958 and 1972. Around this 
period, the two companies also started to establish breweries around Europe and in Asia 
through mergers and/or acquisitions. In terms of international acquisitions Carlsberg has 
made major investments in the German market. For instance, in 1988, Carlsberg 
acquired 83 per cent of Hannen Brauerei GmbH in a follow-up to a 1977 licensee 
agreement with German Reemtsa group, which included Hannen Brauerei. When the 
licensee agreement came to an end, Carlsberg took over Hannen. One reason for doing 
so was the brewery’s location near the Belgian border, which opened up sales 
opportunities in that market. Carlsberg also acquired Holsten-Brauerei in 2004 and 
Göttsche Getränke in 2006.  
Other than Germany, Carlsberg has been actively investing in the European 
markets. For instance, its investments include the 1991 acquisition of a controlling 
interest in Unicer, the largest brewer in Portugal (Carlsberg 2001). Subsequently, 
Carlsberg sold its stake in Spanish Union Cervecera, which had been experiencing 
losses for several years. In 1970, Carlsberg entered into a partnership with the British 
beer maker Watney to build a larger brewery in Northampton. Later, due to 
restructuring within the industry, the Danish brewery obtained 100 per cent control of 
this business (Business Insights Essentials 2012). Furthermore, Carlsberg formed a 
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 strategic alliance with Allied-Lyons in Britain. The new firm, a 50/50 joint venture 
known as Carlsberg-Tetley P.L.C,, build an 18 per cent market share. In Italy, Carlsberg 
acquired Poretti in 1982. It also acquired 50 per cent of the shares in the Finnish 
brewing operation Oy Sinebrychoff AB in 1988 and the remainder in 2000. That same 
year, Carlsberg acquired Feldschlösschen Getränke in Switzerland. In 1996, Carlsberg 
acquired 31.6 per cent of Polish Okocim and it took full ownership in 2004. In 2002, 
Carlsberg gained 11 per cent of the Croatian market by acquiring an 80 per cent stake in 
Panonska Pivovara, which manages three leading brands: Pan, Tuborg and Kaj 
(Niederhut-Bollmann and Theuvsen 2008). More recently, Carlsberg has expanded in 
China through acquisition of local breweries. Its first move in eastern China failed due 
to harsh price competition and high target prices. As a result, Carlsberg focused on 
breweries in western China. It now holds a controlling interest in Xinjang Wusu Beer 
and Dali Beer, and a minority interest in several other breweries (Carlsberg Information 
til Aktionærer 2006). 
The latest major investment was the takeover of Scottish & Newcastle, the 
former alliance partner in BBH. This was a joint acquisition with Heineken. At the time 
of the takeover, Scottish & Newcastle was considered to be a leading European brewery 
with operations in 15 countries. Its’ assets were divided between Carlsberg and 
Heineken, so that Carlsberg gained 100 per cent ownership of BBH and Scottish & 
Newcastle’s French (Kronenbourg), Greek (Mythos), Chinese and Vietnamese 
operations, whereas Heineken gained control Scottish & Newcastle’s UK, Irish, 
Portuguese, Finnish, Belgian, US and Indian operations. The takeover gave Carlsberg 
leading positions in the East European, Russian, French and Greek markets, which were 
expected to counter the declining beer consumption in the mature west European 
markets. Through the full control of BBH, Carlsberg also controlled a range of 
subsidiaries.  
The acquisitions of breweries and their immediate launch into new roles by 
redistributing value chain activities clearly illustrate Carlsberg’s views on strategic 
development of its subsidiaries. One characteristic of Carlsberg is its emphasis on 
efficiency in its production and distribution processes as key to its success. In numerous 
cases, this overall motive has affected the acquired subsidiaries and their development. 
An example is the acquisition of Norwegian Ringness and Swedish Pripps, where old 
production plants were closed and production moved to new plants (Carlsberg 2001). 
Another case is the acquisition of Finnish Sinebrychoff, where production and 
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 administration improved after Carlsberg took full ownership, for instance, through the 
introduction of new types of packaging (Carlsberg 2005). Similar developments were 
evident in the acquisition of Derbes in Kazakhstan, which was accompanied with major 
upgrades in production quality, national sales, distribution and management (Carlsberg, 
2002). In fact, the upgrading of the Derbes’ bottling line turned the brewery into one of 
the most modern in Europe. Another characteristic of Carlsberg is the tendency to 
restructure value-chain activities, often leading to a centralization of functions. This is 
illustrated in the cases of its Finnish subsidiary and Italian division (Carlsberg 2002). 
An inspection of Carlsberg’s individual subsidiaries reveals that subsidiaries differ with 
respect to strategic responsibilities they are allocated. For example, central coordination 
of procurement is located in Switzerland, accounting in Poland and R&D in France 
(Datamonitor 2011). Therefore, Carlsberg appears confident that it can derive value by 
streamlining and centralizing across borders, while it still seems to recognize that 
substantial value is created locally in each individual market. 
Overall, we can conclude that Carlsberg’s acquisition of foreign breweries is 
driven by efficiency seeking motive, while its post-acquisition integration is to a large 
extent determined by value creation. A closer inspection of different acquisitions and 
post-acquisition integrations reveals significant heterogeneity of processes and 
upgrades. To explore this heterogeneity in more detail, we turn our attention now to the 
analysis of the six acquisitions in the European market.  
 
Okocim 
In 1996, Carlsberg acquired a 31.8 per cent stake in the Polish brewery 
Okocimskie Zaklady Piwowarskie S. A. (Okocim). At the time, Poland was a major, 
growing beer market with 40 million inhabitants and a per capita annual demand of 40 
liters. Furthermore, during the economic transition from the command to market based 
economy, Polish citizens were experiencing increases in their purchasing power and 
began to shift their consumption preferences from spirits to beer (Glamann 1997). 
Carlsberg revised its investment strategy and increased its ownership stake in the 
brewery first to 50.1 per cent in 2001 and then to 100 per cent in 2007 (Carlsberg 2007). 
Three minor breweries (Kaszelan, Bosman and Piast) were also acquired in 2001. In 
2004, Okocim was delisted from the stock exchange and was renamed Carlsberg Polska 
(Carlsberg 2004).  
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 At the time of the acquisition, Okocim was highly inefficient, so Carlsberg spent 
€70m to increase its efficiency, making major investments in production capacity and 
modernization, leading to a tripling of capacity (Carlsberg 2006; Reuters Finans 2009). 
Later, associated breweries in Krakow and Chociw were closed down (Poland Business 
News 2002) and production in Piast was reallocated to other plants (Børsen, 2004c). In 
total, the number of production sites was reduced from four to three, the number of 
packaging sites from twelve to seven and the number of warehouses from twelve to six 
(Koudal and Engel 2007). An example of strategic development was that the subsidiary 
gained an international market mandate– the Okocim brand was launched in the UK 
(The Grocer 11 March 2006), targeting the 600 000 Polish inhabitants in the country 
(Marketing Week 2007). The Okocim brand was also launched in India (Business 
Today 2007). 
This example illustrates the subsidiary’s loss of strategic responsibilities in the 
period immediately following the takeover, followed by the introduction of Carlsberg’s 
best practices. However, over time the subsidiary developed a mandate and gained 
responsibility for international activities.  
 
Tetley 
The acquisition of Tetley in 1997 was the largest foreign takeover by a Danish 
company from 1994 to 1998 (Gammelgaard 2002). Despite the fact that through the 
acquisition Carlsberg became the dominating brewer in the UK, it saw a need to refocus 
its strategy as it held only 13 per cent of the market (Børsen 2000). The company 
decided to implement a radical restructuring process. It divested or closed three of its 
five breweries in the UK, and was left only with its original brewery in Northampton 
and Tetley’s headquarters in Leeds (Børsen 1998a). Carlsberg invested around £40m to 
increase capacity in these two breweries (Børsen 1998a; Carlsberg Press Release 1997). 
The restructuring also led to the layoff of 1500 of the 3700 employees in the UK 
(Børsen 1997; Jyllands Posten 1998) and the administration services in Birmingham 
relocated to Northampton. Despite these cutbacks, all brands were kept in the portfolio 
(Børsen 1997b). In the years that followed the implementation of the plan, Carlsberg’s 
earnings fell (Børsen 1998b). However, the process continued with the renaming of 
Carlsberg Tetley to Carlsberg UK in 2004, although the Tetley brand was kept in the 
portfolio. In 2011, Carlsberg closed the original Tetley brewery in Leeds (Datamonitor 
2008; Børsen 2011a) and relocated production of Tetley to Northampton. This move 
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 was based on a review of the supply chain, which indicated that two major Carlsberg 
breweries in the UK were not sustainable (ICM 2008), and on the recession’s impact on 
demand. (The Guardian, 2008). 
This case illustrates a target firm dramatic loss of losing strategic responsibility. 
The Tetley acquisition was significant in size. Yet, events external to the firm – mainly 
increasing governmental regulations and competitive reactions – led to a set of changes. 
The case also illustrates that the specialized resource in this market was access to 
distributions channels, which the subsidiary lacked in the end.  
 
Feldschlösschen 
Carlsberg acquired the Swiss brewer Feldschlösschen in 2000  (Carlsberg 
press release 2000) for a price of CHF 870 million. The target company had a 45 per 
cent market share in Switzerland and employed 2600 people. The company had also 
found a niche in export markets, selling 0.2 million hl of its non-alcoholic beer, 
Moussy, to the Middle East and North Africa. For the 1998/99 fiscal year, 
Feldschlösschen had CHF 1.02 billion in turnover and CHF 60 million in earnings. The 
company had seven production sites and 27 distribution centers. It was further 
diversified into beverage supplies for private customers, the wine business and soft 
drinks.  
This acquisition introduced Carlsberg to the Swiss market, as Feldschlösschen 
did not have an international premium brand in its portfolio, even though this was a 
growing segment in the Swiss market. After the takeover, the sales, logistics and 
administrative functions were restructured and significant investments were undertaken 
to improve production efficiency (Carlsberg 2001). Some of the breweries were 
integrated– for example, Rheinfelden North was integrated into Rheinfelden South 
(Carlsberg 2002). In 2003, the soft drink establishment Eglisau Mineral Spring was 
spun off (Carlsberg 2003) and wine activities were later divested (Berlingske Tidende 
2004). Over time, the number of employees was reduced from 2600 to 1600 (Business 
Insights Essentials 2012).  
The result was an increase of market share of Feldschlösschen to 48 per cent in 
2008. This growth was driven by cost-efficiency programs and market strategies for 
premium beers that had been adopted from Carlsberg. The company also initiated a new 
product– a beer labeled “EVE” – which targeted women and gave Feldschlösschen a 
first-mover advantage on the Swiss market (RB-Børsen 2008). This process was also 
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 characterized by losses of value-chain activities. The plant in Fribourg was closed in 
2011 due to overcapacity in the Swiss breweries. The production was moved to the 
French Obernai brewery, which was a Kronenbourg subsidiary (Ritzaus Bureau 2010). 
In addition, Feldschlösschen’s subsidiary in Dresden was sold to the German brewery 
Frankfurther Brauhaus (RB-Børsen 2011a). On the other hand, Switzerland was often 
used a test market and as a producer of best practices, such as an IT-based business 
standardization program. In addition, the experience with the Fribourg brewery was to 
benefit the MNC in subsequent closures (Børsen Magasin 2011).  
At the time of the takeover, Feldschlösschen possessed many strategic 
responsibilities and was a subsidiary with substantial size and market power. In contrast 
to many of its other acquisitions, Carlsberg chose to make a full acquisition. However, 
due to efficiency processes, many of the subsidiary’s mandates were removed. This 
process continues today, some 12 years after the takeover. However, the subsidiary still 
has the mandate to develop and introduce new brands.  
 
Holsten 
In 2004, Carlsberg acquired a majority shareholding in Holsten-Brauerei 
(Holsten), a brewery founded in 1879. Holsten had started exporting in 1952 and 
launched licensee production in the United Kingdom in 1976. At the time of the 
acquisition, the target firm was spread over four sites and had 1500 employees. Holsten 
was an international player with sales in 90 countries. The brewery had made a number 
of acquisitions in Germany, including Bavaria-St. Paulie-Brauerei in 1998 and König 
Pilsner in 2001 (Datamonitor 2004). Before the takeover, it held a market position as 
number two in northern Germany and number five in Germany as a whole. 
Carlsberg saw potential benefits from exporting the Holsten brand to Russia and 
the UK. The company also believed synergies could be derived from transferring 
Carlsberg’s best practices in production and procurement in the subsidiary, and from 
cross-selling the Carlsberg and Holsten brands. Most important, however, was the fact 
that the acquisition provided Carlsberg with access to Holsten’s distribution network, 
which included 20000 points of sale. In Western European markets, control over 
distribution channels determines which brands will be offered in the shops. In many 
cases, these decisions are made by local distributers, who are not controlled by the 
breweries. Furthermore, it is time consuming and costly for breweries to build their 
distribution networks (Børsen 2004b). Some suggested that this distribution network 
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 was more important than the Holsten brewery itself given the brewery’s low 
profitability (Børsen 2004b).  
Cost efficiencies were achieved over time by, for example, reallocating 
production through the spinoff of the brewery in Monchengladbach and the transfer of 
.5 million hl of beer to Holsten (Børsen 2004a). Carlsberg also began production of 
Holsten beer at its Northampton production unit, which eliminated transportation costs, 
reduced lead times and allowed for faster responses to competitor promotions and 
changing customer demands (Carlsberg Press release 2005). In 2012, Carlsberg took 
over the Holsten brand in Russia, which was previously held by SABMiller. Holsten 
was the fourth-largest brand in the Russian super-premium segment (Reuters Finans 
2012). At the same time, the Financial Times Deutschland stated that Carlsberg’s CEO, 
Jørgen Buhl Rasmussen, was considering a spin-off of Holsten due to decreasing sales 
in the mature German market, which had led to a market share of less than 5 per cent 
(RB-Børsen, 2011b). 
Initially, Carlsberg’s acquisition of Holsten held certain prospects, which could 
have led to a further strategic development of the subsidiary. However, the subsidiary 
lacked resources, which, when combined with the declining German market, meant that 
it lost mandates. These developments should be viewed in the light of a takeover of a 
weak player in the market, and where financial reorganizations had to me made. This, in 
combination with market pressure, initiated a negative spiral in terms of subsidiary 
development. 
 
Kronenbourg 
Kronenbourg, a French brewery, was “indirectly” acquired by Carlsberg in 2008, 
when Carlsberg was involved in the Scottish and Newcastle acquisition. Carlsberg and 
Heineken agreed that Kronenbourg would be transferred to Carlsberg. The company 
was previously owned by Group Danone, but was taken over by Scottish and Newcastle 
in 2000. At the time of its takeover by Carlsberg, Kronenbourg held a dominant position 
in the French market. It also possessed strong brands, such as 1664, and controlled 
important distribution networks. In addition, it was recognized for its innovative 
abilities and sophisticated approach to brewing (Protz 2004). However, due to 
decreasing sales on the French market, the economic and financial crisis, and the 
increased regulation of the brewery sector, Carlsberg opted for a complete 
reorganization of the subsidiary. Consequently, 214 of the unit’s 1400 employees were 
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 laid off, a range of minor brands were downgraded and the subsidiary’s CEO was 
replaced with the Swiss CEO from Feldschlösschen (Ritzaus Bureau 2008). After three 
years of restructuring, however, the company was still struggling, despite expensive 
marketing campaigns (Børsen 2011b). Nevertheless, the subsidiary gained a significant 
mandate, as the Carlsberg R&D center dedicated to beer and packaging – a EUR 17 
million investment – located in the Obernai location. The Obernai plant already brewed 
and marketed several important brands, such as Kronenbourg 1664, Grimbergen, 
Kanterbrau and Carlsberg. Additional capacity was to be added through an investment 
of EUR 11 million. This brought a geographical relocation of production – for example, 
some of the Feldschlösschen production was to be transferred to the French site, turning 
this site into a European cluster (Just-drinks, 2012).  
This case illustrates that a subsidiary can simultaneously win and lose mandates 
in different parts of the value chain. After the acquisition, the subsidiary controlled 
resources upon which both headquarters and other subsidiaries depended, such as R&D 
and capacity, which should also lead to future strategic developments. 
 
Baltika Breweries 
The state-owned Baltika Brewery was founded in 1990 and focused on 
producing quality beer from the beginning. In 1999, a modern factory was completed in 
St. Petersburg, which was also the location of the company’s headquarters. In 1992, 
Baltika became part of a joint venture with Orkla (named BBH– Baltic Beverages 
Holding), in which Carlsberg first held a 30 per cent stake and then a 50 per cent stake. 
In 2008, Carlsberg increased its share to 88.86 per cent as an outcome of the acquisition 
of Scottish and Newcastle. Today, Baltika is the largest brewing company in the 
Russian Federation and in Eastern Europe, with more than 9500 employees. Baltika is 
also the most well-known brand in these regions and is sold in 98 per cent of relevant 
stores in Russia (Børsen 2008).The brand was valued at USD 2.3 billion in 2010 
(Interbrand 2010). Approximately 25% of Carlsberg’s revenue is generated by Baltika 
(Carlsberg 2011).  
Baltika controls 10 subsidiaries and 12 production plants. An organization of 
this size is naturally well positioned in an MNC network, and Baltika collaborates with 
other Carlsberg subsidiaries to a high degree. For example, Baltika has an agreement to 
share marketing costs with the Finnish subsidiary Sinebrychoff Oy. It also has an 
agreement with Feldschlösschen, which the two subsidiaries buy consultancy services 
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 from each other. Balticas’ brand, production technologies and production capacity, and 
its close connections with the external environment place this subsidiary in a favorable 
position. Other organizational units depend on this subsidiary’s resources. The 
subsidiary’s strategic importance is evident in the transfer of its best practices to other 
Carlsberg subsidiaries. As the CEO says: “The rest of Carlsberg can learn from the 
drive that is in BBH and the rest of Eastern Europe” (Direkt 2007). Furthermore, the 
power the subsidiary gains from Carlsberg’s investment in Baltika’s 12 production 
plants increases the production capacity relative to other subsidiaries. In addition, the 
proportion of Carlsberg’s total revenues derived from the Russian subsidiary has 
increased.  
There have been several strategic developments. Since 2008, BBH has 
established licensee production in Japan, Uzbekistan, Australia, Kazakhstan, France, 
Italy and the Ukraine. Simultaneously, Baltika has launched exports to such countries as 
Lebanon, Vietnam, Norway, Chile, Malaysia, Guinea, Panama, Costa Rica, Congo, 
Syria, Mexico, Brazil, Bulgaria, Mali, Sierra Leone and Romania. In fact, the subsidiary 
has entered more than 60 markets since 2000. Product development has also taken 
place, including the introduction of new sizes of aluminum cans. However, the most 
significant development is a greenfield investment to establish a modern brewery in 
Novosibirsk. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study, we have analyzed the post-acquisition integration of acquired firms 
and subsequent developments in new subsidiary strategic responsibilities in value-chain 
activities. The extant international business literature emphasizes the importance of this 
dimension in headquarter-subsidiary relationships, but it is somehow neglected in the 
M&A literature. We have illustrated the forms, degrees and evolution of strategic 
responsibilities using in-depth analysis of six acquisitions from the Danish brewery, 
Carlsberg. Carlsberg, an experienced international player in the brewery sector, had 
developed a certain acquisition-integration strategy over the years, which influenced the 
strategic development of the acquired subsidiaries. The case analysis reveals that, 
typically, there has been transfer of best practices from Carlsberg to newly acquired 
firms, mainly in form of product and process technologies, and managerial skills. At the 
time of acquisitions plants were divested, some brands were spun off, and Carlsberg or 
Tuborg brand was added to the local product portfolio. The initial mandates at the time 
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 of acquisition were designed based on new subsidiaries’ core competencies and 
resources, and Carlsberg’s acquisition motives. Yet, the mandates did not remain static. 
Over time, some subsidiaries gained new value chain mandates or they substantially 
increased their scale in terms of production capacities or the markets in which they 
operated. 
The M&A literature has long reported evidence of unsuccessful acquisitions 
(Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter and Davison, 2009). Our analysis confirms 
that not all acquisitions are successful, with Carlsberg displaying examples of both 
failure and success. Out of the six cases we analyzed, Tetley and Holsten are examples 
of unsuccessful acquisitions. Both breweries possessed significant market positions but 
suffered from negative market developments that they were unable to bypass. In both 
cases, this resulted in the removal of a range of strategic responsibilities. In contrast, in 
the case of Feldschlösschen, Okocim and Kronenbourg, the subsidiaries managed to 
overcome such problems. After a period of mandate losses, they appeared to be on 
positive development track. However, an important finding is that this is a parallel 
process, as these subsidiaries simultaneously lost mandates in some value chain 
activities, while gaining mandates in others. Finally, Baltika represents a special case. It 
successfully broadened its activities in a period characterized by market decline driven 
by the introduction of new regulations. The size of this subsidiary and the value of its 
brand put it in a central position, to the extent that headquarters depended on its 
resources in terms of revenue and capacity. The subsidiary could therefore gain greater 
strategic responsibilities in all areas. 
Through our analysis, we contribute to on-going research on subsidiary strategic 
development by demonstrating that often subsidiaries undergo simultaneously negative 
and positive processes. Moreover, we confirm the findings of Schweizer (2005) that 
saw the use of a hybrid approach in the pharmaceutical industry. Apparently, such 
integration strategy is also used in a less technology-intensive industry as the brewery 
industry. Hence, this study contributes to the post-acquisition integration literature as 
well by emphasizing the dynamic nature of the development of subsidiary mandates and 
the continuous tradeoffs between autonomy and integration. The practical implication of 
this finding suggests that managers of the acquiring firm must pay close attention to the 
form and extent of integration if the acquisition is fulfill its potential.    
The small size and scope of our sample do not allow for greater generalizability 
of results. Yet, the approach we follow opens up several opportunities for future 
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 research. For instance, any replication study must expand upon our framework to 
include in investigation industry and geographical effects. The brewery sector in 
Western Europe is under intense pressure and, in some markets, subsidiaries are 
struggling to survive. At the same time, several subsidiaries seem to be able to gain new 
strategic responsibilities. To further examine the development path of subsidiary 
strategic responsibility, the research design must focus on managers to unearth their 
considerations and motivations regarding specific events in the subsidiary’s history. 
Given our focus only on archival data, this paper only presents a limited view of the 
underlying processes.  
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